Java KeyStores – the gory details

Java KeyStores are used to store key material and associated certificates in an encrypted and integrity protected fashion. Like all things Java, this mechanism is pluggable and so there exist a variety of different options. There are lots of articles out there that describe the different types and how you can initialise them, load keys and certificates, etc. However, there is a lack of detailed technical information about exactly how these keystores store and protect your key material. This post attempts to gather those important details in one place for the most common KeyStores.
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So how *do* you validate (NIST) ECDH public keys?

Updated 20th July 2017 to clarify notation for the point of infinity. A previous version used the symbol 0 (zero) rather than O, which may have been confusing

In the wake of the recent critical security vulnerabilities in some JOSE/JWT libraries around ECDH public key validation, a number of implementations scrambled to implement specific validation of public keys to eliminate these attacks. But how do we know whether these checks are sufficient? Is there any guidance on what checks should be performed? The answer is yes, but it can be a bit hard tracking down exactly what validation needs to be done in which cases. For modern elliptic curve schemes like X25519 and Ed25519, there is some debate over whether validation should be performed at all in the basic primitive implementations, as the curve eliminates some of the issues while high-level protocols can be designed to eliminate others. However, for the NIST standard curves used in JOSE, the question is more clear cut: it is absolutely critical that public keys are correctly validated, as evidenced by the linked security alert.

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Updating OpenAM’s encryption

Updated 30th March 2017 to reflect updated information (see comments), add additional links and add some clarifying text about why misuse-resistance is useful.

With the impending release of the ForgeRock Identity Platform, I thought I’d spend some time writing up a few of the bits of OpenAM 14 that I was directly involved with creating. One of my last acts before leaving FR to go solo, was to put in place the first phase of modernising AM’s aging system credential encryption scheme. Before I start, I should say that this encryption scheme is not used for encrypting user passwords (which are hashed by the LDAP user store, not AM). Instead, this scheme is used for encrypting various system credentials (passwords for SMTP servers, HMAC shared secrets, etc) in the config store and in exported system configurations and in a few other places.

The original (and still default) encryption method was first mentioned in Dante’s Inferno. Actually it dates from the original iPlanet codebase from the mid-90s, and uses correspondingly ancient cryptographic algorithms (MD5 and DES). It is best to regard it as providing only limited obfuscation of credentials, rather than any true security guarantees, and the advice has always been to secure the config store by traditional means (TLS, access controls) rather than rely on this encryption. Still, we can do much better than this now, so AM 14 ships with a new AESWrapEncryption scheme that provides significantly improved security:

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Should you use JWT/JOSE?

In the wake of some more recent attacks against popular JSON Web Token (JWT)/JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE) libraries, there has been some renewed criticism of the JWT/JOSE standards themselves (see also discussion on lobste.rs with an excellent comment from Thomas Ptacek summarising some of the problems with the standard). Given these criticisms, should you use JOSE at all? Are articles like my recent “best practices” one just encouraging adoption of bad standards that should be left to die a death?

Certainly, there are lots of potential gotchas in the specs, and it is easy for somebody without experience to shoot themselves in the foot using these standards. I agree with pretty much all of the criticisms levelled against the standards. They are too complicated with too many potentially insecure options. It is far too easy to select insecure combinations or misconfigure them. Indeed, much of the advice in my earlier article can be boiled down to limiting which options you use, understanding what security properties those options do and do not provide, and completely ignoring some of the more troublesome aspects of the spec. If you followed my advice of using “headless” JWTs and direct authenticated encryption with a symmetric key, you’d end up not far off from the advice of just encrypting a JSON object with libsodium or using Fernet.

So in that sense, I am already advocating for not really using the specs as-is, at least not without significant work to understand them and how they fit with your requirements. But there are some cases where using JWTs still makes sense:

  • If you need to implement a standard that mandates their use, such as OpenID Connect. In this case you do not have much of a choice.
  • If you need to interoperate with third-party software that is already using JWTs. Again, in this case you also do not have a choice.
  • You have complex requirements mandating particular algorithms/parameters (e.g. NIST/FIPS-approved algorithms) and don’t want to hand-roll a message format or are required to use something with a “standard”. In this case, JWT/JOSE is not a terrible choice, so long as you know what you are doing (and I hope you do if you are in this position).

If you do have a choice, then you should think hard about whether you need the complexity of JWTs or can use a simpler approach that takes care of most of the choices for you or store state on the server and use opaque cookies. In addition to the options mentioned in the referenced posts, I would also like to mention Macaroons, which can be a good alternative for some authorization token use-cases and the existing libraries tend to build on solid foundations (libsodium/NaCl).

So, should you use JWT/JOSE at all? In many cases the answer is no, and you should use a less error-prone alternative. If you do need to use them, then make sure you know what you are doing.

Critical thinking for software engineers

I am sometimes asked whether doing a PhD was worth it, given that I left academia and research to become a full-time software developer. My answer is an unequivocal “yes”, despite the fact that my thesis is about as relevant to what I do now as a book on the sex lives of giraffes.

By far the most important skill I learnt during that time was not any particular technical knowledge, but rather a general approach to critical thinking—how to evaluate evidence and make rational choices. In a profession such as software engineering, where we are constantly bombarded with new technologies, products and architectural styles, it is absolutely essential to be able to step back and evaluate the pros and cons to form sensible technology choices. In this post I’ll try and summarise the approach I take to making these decisions.

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Bloom Filter session logout – some numbers

The previous post on Stateless Session Logout in OpenAM 13 has proved to be quite popular in terms of this blog. While it went into some detail about the technology and the problems that need to be solved in a production system, it was a bit short on actual figures to illustrate the gains. In this post we will rectify that with some theoretical numbers on memory usage and some measurements from early performance testing.

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